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Expecting Moral Philosophers
to be Reliable∗
James Andow
University of Reading
Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we
entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume
that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ry-
berg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise
defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise
a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive
sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’
experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the
type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of
intuition-use in philosophy.
1 Introduction
Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than the intuitions of people who are not philo-
sophically trained? This question is important to philosophy. Recent empirical work has
been argued to show that intuitions in general are rather unreliable (see, e.g., Zamzow and
Nichols, 2009, who cite a number of studies showing worrying effects in moral intuitions).
So, widespread use of intuition-based reasoning in philosophy is arguably problematic.1
Ryberg (2013) argues against a version of the expertise defence of the reliability of
intuitions in philosophy. The focus of his arguments is the use of intuitions in moral
philosophy. However, his arguments apply fairly generally. The expertise defence relies
upon a positive answer to our opening question. The empirical work on intuitions largely
involves the use of participants with little or no philosophical training. So, if good reason
∗ This paper is forthcoming in Dialectica. This is a personal copy of the accepted paper. Please cite
the official version as page numbers will be different and some small changes may have been made.
1 Other evidence raises distinct important worries about the reliability of intuitions. For example,
evidence suggests that in certain cases the intuitions of laypeople may differ significantly from the
intuitions of philosophers, see, e.g., Buckwalter 2010; Cova and Pain 2012 (see also the debate
between Cohen and Nichols 2010, and Roberts et al. 2014). If that is right, unless reason can be
given for thinking that philosophers’ intuitions are more reliable than those of laypeople (in these
cases), the evidence raises doubts as to whether philosophers should continue to trust their own
intuitions (in the relevant domain). The expertise defence considered in this paper is one that aims
to respond to worries generated by both types of finding (evidence of instability of intuitions, and
evidence of differences between the intuitions of novices and philosophers).
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can be given to expect philosophers’ intuitions to be more reliable, the challenge can be
resisted, for the intuitions which actually get used in philosophy are typically those of
philosophers—so is the thought.
There are a number of ways of advancing the expertise defence. Ryberg considers an
analogical version. The analogy is supposed to be as follows. Mathematics and chess
experts, for example, have great prior experience in their field. And, it is on this basis we
expect their intuitive judgements to be more reliable than those of novices. Experts in
philosophy have much greater experience in their field than philosophical novices. So, it
is sensible to expect philosophers’ intuitions to be more reliable. Ryberg argues this is not
the case, at least with respect to moral philosophers. Ryberg argues that the founding
of the expectation—that experts’ intuitions will be more reliable—upon experts’ greater
prior experience uses two implicit assumptions: the causality assumption and the quality
assumption. Ryberg argues that neither assumption is granted when considering moral
philosophy, and his arguments apply with some generality to much of philosophy.
So, Ryberg’s argument is important. His line of attack against the expertise defence has
the potential to undermine appeals to philosophers’ expertise in defence of intuition-use
once and for all. If there are no good grounds to assume philosophers’ greater reliability,
then evidence that novices’ intuitions are unreliable should be very worrying for advocates
of intuition-use. However, I argue, Ryberg’s arguments fail. I argue we may grant both
the causality and quality assumptions. By doing so, I provide a limited defence of the
expertise defence. Any debate about the merits of the expertise defence needs to focus
elsewhere. If the expertise defence fails, it is not for the reasons Ryberg provides.2
2 The Causality Assumption
The causality assumption is that experts’ intuitions are the result of their prior expe-
riences. Grandmasters and mathematicians, for example, have different intuitions than
novices in part because they have a wide experience of playing chess and mathematical
problem-solving respectively. Their prior experience plays a causal role in shaping their
capacities for intuitive judgement. Ryberg argues that prior experience doesn’t play this
role in moral philosophy.
It is worth making a couple of notes about how I understand the causality assumption.
I think the relevant question is whether there is a causal link between intuitive capacities
and experience; the expertise defence is implausible unless experience in a field plausibly
changes one’s intuitions about that field. However, I need to say something in defence
of this understanding. The reason for this is that Ryberg himself draws a distinction
between two types of causal link—shaping and generating links—and explicitly distances
his discussion from the issue of whether philosophers’ intuitions are shaped by their
experience (Ryberg, 2013, n.7). Since I won’t be doing the same, I should say why.
Ryberg thinks the important issue is whether experts’ previous experience generates
their intuitions rather than whether it shapes them. Before we consider his reasons for
thinking this is the important issue, we first need to consider what this distinction is
supposed to amount to. In what sense are mathematicians’ and grandmasters’ intuitions
plausibly generated by their experience? It is not completely obvious how Ryberg intends
the distinction to be understood. However, it seems likely the idea is that mathematicians
and grandmasters have intuitive capacities which novices do not. The idea seems to be
2 See Rini (2014) for a rather different critical response to Ryberg’s paper.
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that experts in mathematics and chess have new capacities which have been caused to be
by their previous experience rather than capacities that they share with novices which
have been changed by experience. Ryberg thinks this is the most plausible story as to
how mathematicians and grandmasters have different intuitions than novices. I should
note that I am doubtful as to whether this is the more plausible story, given that, as
Ryberg admits, novices in chess and mathematics can and do have some, albeit weak and
vague, intuitions. However, for the sake of argument, let’s grant Ryberg this claim.
The question now is why one should think that the expertise defence could only be
founded by the plausibility of a generating causal link between philosophers’ experience
and intuitions. Why couldn’t the plausibility of a shaping link do the job? Ryberg con-
siders this objection to his approach to the causality assumption (Ryberg, 2013, n.7, p.7).
But his response is not persuasive. Ryberg argues that, if one holds that philosophers’
intuitions are plausibly shaped (but not generated) by their experience,
then it is no longer clear that the standard analogies (to mathematics or chess)
hold: in these cases intuitions are most plausibly explained as generated by
experience.
As I have noted, I am doubtful about the idea that intuitions are plausibly generated by
experience in mathematics and chess. However, even if mathematicians’ and grandmas-
ters’ intuitions are generated, I don’t understand why this would threaten the analogy.
Not all features of the causal link between experience in mathematics/chess and intuitions
are relevant to the analogy. I can see no reason to think the supposed fact that the link in
mathematics/chess is a generating one is a relevant one. Appreciating that his response
will not be persuasive, Ryberg makes two further points (Ryberg, 2013, n.7): (i) he argues
that, even if mere shaping is sufficient (for the satisfaction of the causality assumption),
it isn’t clear how one could maintain that philosophers’ experience shapes their intuitions;
(ii) even if the defender of the expertise defence can show that philosophers’ intuitions
are shaped by their experience, they also need to respond to the arguments he raises
concerning the quality assumption. In the following, my discussion addressed both these
points. In section 3, I demonstrate that philosophers’ experience shapes their intuitions,
and, in section 5, I respond to his arguments against the quality assumption.
3 In Defence of the Causality Assumption
In challenging the idea that there is a causal link between experience and intuitions in
moral philosophy, Ryberg considers the example of a reductio argument that the utili-
tarian approach to punishment should be rejected because it has a counterintuitive im-
plication: framing an innocent person can be right if sufficient suffering can be thereby
avoided. Ryberg correctly argues it is implausible this intuition is based on prior expe-
riences involving reductio arguments. While he concedes these are not the only previous
experiences which might influence philosophers’ intuitions, he thinks instead that it is
most plausible that moral intuitions are genetic or otherwise innate. The support he
offers for this is that, while novices in chess and mathematics have only vague intuitions
or fail to have any intuitions at all, philosophical novices have just as many and just
as strong intuitions as philosophers. Ryberg uses inference to the best explanation and
concludes: intuitions in chess and mathematics are caused by experience—explaining
why those with little experience fail to have (strong) intuitions—and, since they don’t
3
exhibit this pattern, moral intuitions don’t come from experience but are likely genetic
or otherwise innate. But this isn’t the best explanation (although I wouldn’t want to
deny that intuitions have any such component).
Ryberg’s mistake is that he simply fails to consider the most obvious account of how
experts’ intuitions might be the (partial) product of their previous experience. Here’s a
simple-headed picture. Grandmasters and mathematicians, for example, have different
intuitions than novices in part because they have a wide experience of playing chess and
mathematical problem-solving respectively. Now consider, as Ryberg encourages, ‘the
intuition of the philosopher who, for the first time, is confronted with a punishment-of-
the-innocent scenario’ (Ryberg, 2013, p.6). What previous experiences of the philosopher
might we think could found the philosophers’ putative greater reliability? The obvious
candidates are those experiences she has of having considered structurally or thematically
similar cases: those involving systemic injustice, punishment of innocents, politically
motivated trials, etc.
This may be less obvious in other philosophical domains. Cases with moral content are
easy to find in newspapers. Other philosophically interesting cases may seem less easy
to find. So let me say something about the sorts of cases I have in mind. What previous
experiences of thematically and structurally similar cases do I think plausibly influence
philosophers’ intuitions? I’ll use a simple headed genealogy of complicated cases. Com-
plicated cases build on simple ones. One doesn’t typically have an intuition about a
very complicated example without some prior experience of similar slightly simpler cases.
Complicated fake barn cases (Gendler and Hawthorne, 2005) build on simple fake barn
cases (Goldman, 1976) and Gettier cases (Gettier, 1963), for example, which build on
yet simpler cases such as Socrates’ case of a jury being persuaded by a lawyer (Burnyeat
and Barnes, 1980). Complicated cases involving finks and antidotes build on simpler
cases involving powers and dispositional properties (Lewis, 1997). Complicated thought
experiments involving populations of mice who evolve big ears and end up living in envi-
ronments where their ears resemble food (see Walsh, 1996) are typically not encountered
by people who have no experience of thinking about biological function and evolution,
etc. And, the simplest cases, upon which the complicated ones build, are such that the
philosopher first encountering them could have encountered them in a newspaper. One
doesn’t come to epistemology without some familiarity with knowledge attributions. One
doesn’t come to metaphysics without having considered a statue or two and their destruc-
tion. And, since beginning with simple everyday cases, expert philosophers have had a
lot of experience with complicated and tricky cases, and have given them the particular
attention to details which comes with consideration in the philosophy classroom and in
the research community.
If you are looking for some feature of philosophers’ experiences and training that has
plausibly affected the intuitions which they have, about the sorts of cases they consider,
then the natural place to start is the large portion of philosophers’ careers spent con-
sidering counterfactual scenarios, thought-experiments, etc. Once you realise this, it is
no mystery why philosophical novices have more and stronger intuitions than novices
in chess and maths. They are not as new to the game as novice mathematicians and
chess players, who may never have encountered proofs or played chess. Normal people
have encountered unjust punishment at close quarters since infancy, so they are perfectly
equipped to have strong intuitions about moral cases (although this is not to say that
they have the same amount of relevant experience as professional ethicists). This point
doesn’t only apply to simple ‘newspaper cases’, it extends to more complicated cases too.
4
Take a bizarre trolley case and a chess problem. Suppose that they are both incredibly
complex (and equally so). It is surely true that the novice may be expected to have
some (albeit, perhaps, weak/unclear) intuitions about the trolley case, but will probably
fail to have any intuitions at all about the chess problem. Given my suggested story,
this is to be expected. Philosophical novices are not as new to the game. They really
have a much greater experience with simple cases than novice chess players who have
next to no such experience. This affords novices significantly better purchase on more
complicated philosophical cases than on more complicated mathematical issues or chess
problems. And so, while novice mathematicians fail to have any intuitions at all about
complex cases, novice philosophers should be expected to have some intuitions. Nothing
Ryberg says detracts from the plausibility of this story, and so nothing he says should
shake our confidence in the causality assumption, even restricted to the moral domain.
4 The Quality Assumption
Even if philosophers’ experience moulds their intuitions, this is no guarantee it moulds
them for the better, rather than in epistemically irrelevant or deleterious ways. It is
only plausible that any moulding which goes on helps refine experts’ intuitions if experts
receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions.
It is worth taking a moment to consider exactly what the quality assumption is sup-
posed to be. Ryberg introduces the quality assumption thus,
. . . the step from experience to expertise presupposes that the activity in ques-
tion is assessable on some sort of quality parameter. (p.7)
The idea is that there must be some intuition-independent source of information about
the quality of our intuitions.3 This is an assumption Ryberg thinks is clearly met in the
case of mathematicians and grandmasters. Mathematicians have experience of engaging
in correct mathematical proofs; grandmasters, of making moves in games they won. This
type of experience is what makes it plausible mathematicians and grandmasters learn from
their previous experience. Ryberg thinks the quality assumption cannot be granted in the
case of moral philosophy, and the considerations he offers seem to extend to philosophy
more generally. Why does Ryberg think the quality assumption can’t be granted? Well,
he identifies some specific experiences he thinks philosophers typically lack.
It is . . . not a correct description of a philosopher’s prior experiences to hold
that she has been through numerous cases in which she started out, say,
by rejecting a moral position because it had a counter-intuitive implication
and then, subsequently, found out that the rejection of this position was in
fact correct. . . . while there exists an intuition-independent criterion for the
assessment of mathematical proofs and success in chess, this is usually not
the case with regard to moral theory. (Ryberg, 2013, p.8)
3 Ryberg sometimes talks in rather different terms. For instance, the quoted section is followed
immediately by, “If it, for a certain activity, does not make sense to talk of being better or worse,
then neither does it make sense to talk of someone as being an expert in this activity” (Ryberg,
2013, p.7). This might suggest that Ryberg is going to argue that it doesn’t make sense to talk
about intuitions about (moral) philosophy being better or worse. This can’t be Ryberg’s aim. One
obvious way a person’s intuitions might be better than another’s is to be more reliable (or to have
a greater proportion of true intuitions). Ryberg doesn’t do anything to argue against this claim.
5
Ryberg argues that there are no such sources from which one might receive feedback in
(moral) philosophy. Similar suspicions lie at the heart of other worries about intuition,
e.g., worries about calibration initiated by Cummins (1998) and developed by Weinberg
et al. (2012). Stich (2010) also raises similar worries saying that there is obviously no
way to check philosophers’ intuitions about, for instance, Gettier cases that compares to
the way one can check the judgements of trained radiologists using surgery or autopsy.
In the following, I argue that it is wrong to think that the quality assumption cannot
be granted in philosophy. That said, I don’t dispute the fact that philosophers rarely (if
ever) have the opportunity to simply check whether their intuitions are true by consulting
the equivalent of a handy thermometer. So how then can I claim that they have intuition-
independent means to assess the quality of their intuitions? My argument will proceed
as follows. First, I make a number of clarifications concerning the sense in which these
means must be independent of intuitions. Then, in section 5, I argue, in the light of these
clarifications, philosophers have intuition-independent sources of information about the
quality of their intuitions, and the feedback they get from these sources is sufficient to
found the expectation that philosopher’s intuitions are more reliable than those of novices.
What does the requirement that philosophers have intuition-independent sources of
feedback amount to? There are three strong readings which Ryberg might have in mind
but which would be too strong. Firstly, one might require that it is possible to deter-
mine that an intuitive judgement is false on epistemic grounds in which intuitions play
no role.4 This is asking too much. Ryberg recognises the norms of mathematical proof
as providing the requisite intuition-independent means of quality-assessment for math-
ematical intuition. However, the epistemic grounds for these norms surely derive from
more basic intuitions, e.g., the unacceptability of contradiction. Furthermore, to require
a means of assessment with intuition-independent epistemic grounds, one would have to
defend some rather substantive position in epistemology (for, it is fairly plausible that
intuitions, i.e., non-inferential judgements, play an essential role in the epistemic support
for most of our beliefs).
Secondly, one might require independent means that provide,
. . . direct corroboration of results, i.e., corroboration by evidence from other
sources showing directly that a certain result is correct (e.g. my tactile per-
ception of the glass directly corroborates my visual perception of the glass)
(Seeger, 2011, p.3)
where the alternative is to allow intuition-independent sources which provide only indirect
corroboration,
such as successful application of a method’s results in other fields. (p.3).
Seeger makes the point—when disambiguating Weinberg’s (2007) use of ‘external corrob-
oration’ but his point is applicable here too—that to allow only direct forms of corrobo-
ration would be too strong. Most mathematical or logical claims are simply not subject
to intuition-independent forms of direct corroboration.
Thirdly, one might think that the sources of feedback must be intuition-independent in
the sense that they mustn’t make use of any intuitions about any domain.5 For instance,
one might think that rejecting a position because it seems to lead to incoherence doesn’t
4 Maybe this is what Pust has in mind—in his characterisation of the argument from lack of inde-
pendent calibration—when he talks of ‘independent justification’ (Pust, 2014).
5 This is intended to be a weaker reading than the first reading. The first reading rules out feedback in
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count as intuition-independent, because one’s intuition that incoherence is a sign of false-
hood is playing a role. Insofar as this sort of move does rely upon intuitions, it cannot be
the case that it does so in a problematic way. Ryberg accepts that logicians’ and math-
ematicians’ experience in judging the success of proof strategies refines their intuitions,
and rejection on grounds of contradiction is one of the main tools of mathematical proof.
Such rejections use the same basic intuitions, and so philosophers should not have to forgo
the intuition-independence of reductio arguments, etc. Likewise, a philosopher shouldn’t
be forbidden appeal to grammatical intuitions where relevant, or to intuitions in any
other domain in which she is also expert, so long as, with respect to that domain, there is
reason to think her training and experience has refined her intuitions, e.g., philosophers
trained in experimental psychology may be permitted (perhaps limited) appeal to their
intuitions about psychological claims.
It seems that if we are to permit that expert mathematicians’ intuitions are refined
by appropriately intuition-independent means, then the sense of intuition-independent
we have in mind must be something like the following: a source of direct or indirect
corroboration which is not simply one’s intuitions from the very same domain.
5 In Defence of the Quality Assumption
If this is the sense of intuition-independent sources we insist upon, then Ryberg’s con-
tention looses its appeal. It is really not so clear that philosophers do not regularly receive
such feedback from intuition-independent sources. In this section, I argue that philoso-
phers receive a substantial amount of such feedback about the quality of their intuitions. I
also argue that this feedback is sufficient to found the expectation that philosophers have
more reliable intuitions than novices: I argue that philosophers receive more feedback
than novices; I also respond to some worries one might have about whether the types of
sources I identify provide sufficient feedback.
Weinberg (2007, pp.330-1) provides a useful taxonomy of the ways in which we can
obtain confidence that the use of a source of evidence such as intuitions is reliable.6 He
which any intuitions play an epistemic role, e.g., some part in the justification. The second reading
rules out only actual use of intuitions in the sense of explicit recourse to intuitive claims from any
domain.
6 A couple of notes on the relation between my discussion and Weinberg’s in order to avoid confusion:
(a) Weinberg talks in terms of ‘hope’. I avoid this technical term as it is unnecessary for my
purposes.
(b) I present Weinberg’s ideas in terms of reliability. Weinberg himself explicitly distances his
discussion from claims about reliability. In particular, he says that it is not the mere reli-
ability/unreliability of a source which makes the difference between it being trustworthy or
untrustworthy (p.325). That may be right. However, I think we can still talk in terms of
reliability. We can say, it is not the reliability of our intuitive capacities which matters, but
rather the reliability of our practice of using those capacities.
(c) I talk about three sources. Weinberg talks about four. I don’t discuss internal coherence;
demonstrating that philosophers get feedback about the internal coherence of intuitions—
feedback concerning intrapersonal and interpersonal agreement—would not help me argue
against Ryberg. It is not feedback from an intuition-independent source.
(d) Weinberg and I are involved in distinct debates. Weinberg asks whether intuitions are ‘hope-
less’. I ask whether philosophers’ intuitions should be expected to have been refined to any
degree (by certain types of feedback). These debates are connected, but not in a straight-
forward way. Importantly, my conclusion is compatible with Weinberg’s conclusion that
intuitions are, for now, ‘hopeless’.
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notes three sources of intuition-independent feedback one might have about the quality
of a source of evidence.
1. Indirect forms of external corroboration: such as (un)successful application of the-
ories in another field.
2. Detectability of margins: if our practices are sensitive to the conditions in which the
source is likely to go wrong/be okay this is a source of confidence—as Kahneman
and Klein (2009, 524) put it, “True experts, it is said, know when they don’t know”.
3. Theoretical illumination: having good theories about why the margins are as they
are. These are all potential sources of feedback about the quality of intuitions.
All these ways of getting information about the quality of intuitions are available to
philosophers. Let me take them in turn. (Weinberg himself argues use of intuitions is
problematic precisely because these sources don’t give us enough confidence. So, there is
some tension between his points and my strategy here which is worth acknowledging—I
address the relevant worries he raises in the following.)
5.1 External Corroboration (including indirect)
The results of use of moral intuitions can be and are regularly (un)successfully applied in
other fields. As Seeger (2011) notes, the results of moral theorising guide our moral and
legal practice. Philosophers’ intuitions about race, rape, harassment and the punishment
of innocents are shaped by consideration of the effect that the application of theories
which give weight to certain intuitions rather than others have had on moral and legal
practice. For example, those nationalist intuitions I once had have largely dissolved, and
introspectively it seems that this is in large part due to thinking about the success/failure
of both real societies whose legal/moral practice was largely founded on such intuitions,
and to thinking counterfactually about what our society would look like if modified in
line with such intuitions.7 It is not only intuitions in normative ethics which receive this
treatment, but also those about freedom, responsibility, action, causation, etc.8
Epistemologists interested in epistemic norms are also interested in how people conduct
their epistemic lives in all sorts of domains. Weinberg (2007) addresses this point asking
a rhetorical question and answering it:
[Epistemologists] may scratch their heads at this suggestion—what, other
than intuition, could speak to the norms that are to guide our believings,
reasonings, deliberations, and so on?. . . We have had a long and fairly well-
documented history of trying out different norms to guide our inquiries, and
we can learn from our historians which norms have been active when and
what results they seem to have yielded. And we can use our best information
about the structure of investigative communities both past and present, as
well as what we know about the human agents who operate within them, to
speculate counterfactually about what results various sorts of norms might or
might not generate for us today. (Weinberg, 2007, p.339)
7 Both are processes which rely on some sort of intuitive judgement. However, as we have noted, this
doesn’t preclude them from being intuition-independent sources of the appropriate type.
8 I don’t deny that a society might do very well despite having a legal/moral system based on false
intuitions. Considering such things provides some, but not conclusive, corroborative evidence. The
same is true of the indirect corroboration that mathematics gets from successful application in other
fields such as engineering and biology.
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Although Weinberg himself is not so optimistic that similar resources are available for
other areas of philosophy, I think they clearly are. The metaphysics, e.g., of causation is
guided to a degree by scientific progress and empirically-informed understandings of rele-
vant concepts and phenomena. Consider what Paul says when considering the empirical
nature and extent of metaphysics:
Metaphysical theories often involve hypotheses about fundamental and gen-
eral ways of structuring the world, and thus are only indirectly confirmed by
their overall success in making sense of ordinary and scientific experience and
language. (Paul, 2012)
If a metaphysical account can’t make sense of what scientists find and how scientists
talk, this is taken to provide a source of feedback that things may not be going so well in
the metaphysics. It may be that there are some corners of philosophy in which routine
feedback which draws on other domains of enquiry is not available. However, it is not the
norm. Although I don’t want to put too much weight on it, it is also interesting to note
that consideration of the implications of an intuitive position in other areas of philosophy
can count as intuition-independent feedback in the right sort of way. Just as thinking
about compatibility of one’s intuition-based moral theory with one’s logical theory can
be an appropriate source of feedback, so could thinking about the implications of one’s
moral theory in metaphysics, for instance.
5.2 Detectability of Margins
We are sensitive to the margins of intuitions. We get feedback about the quality of
our intuitions due to our sensitivity. We get more such feedback than philosophical
novices do. Philosophers are attentive to feedback relating to what types of factor mean
intuition is likely to give good/bad results. Philosophers are far more careful about the
types of intuition they are willing to give credence than novices—particularly in moral
philosophy. In some respects, novices are overly-cautious, philosophers are willing to
consider intuitions about unlikely counter-factual cases which can provide interesting
illumination, e.g., about internal inconsistency in an account, whereas undergraduates
can be very unwilling to consider such cases. In other respects, philosophers exhibit
appropriate caution where novices do not. Philosophers try not to let irrelevant factors
affect the intuitive judgements they use, e.g., I am aware that trying to accommodate
the extent to which the cuddliness of an animal used to alter my intuitions about its
intelligence leads to theoretical problems, and my intuitions have grown to be largely
immune to this effect when in a reflective context.9
Weinberg (2007, pp.335–6) himself thinks there is reason to doubt that intuition has
detectability of margins. His main argument concerns the supposed fact that intuitions
effectively provide a digital signal, e.g., such and such proposition is true/false, and so
lack a richness that typifies sense perception. Let’s accept this for the sake of argument.
It is true that this provides great reason to think we don’t get the same amount of
feedback about our intuitions as we do sense perceptions (in this respect). However, it
provides no good reason to think we don’t get more feedback about our intuitions than
9 My point here is not that philosophers’ intuitions are necessarily thereby less prone to distortions
or biases. The point is merely that this is evidence of our getting more feedback about the quality
of our intuitions due to our greater interest in the margins of our intuitions. This can help refine
our intuitions even if it does not make them any less vulnerable to distortion and bias.
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philosophical novices.10 Remember, what I am urging here is simply the plausibility of
the following point: philosophers’ intuitions are generated by processes that have been
refined by feedback they receive about what types of factor mean intuition is likely to
give good/bad results.11
5.3 Theoretical Illumination
Do we get feedback about the quality of our intuitions based upon theoretical illumina-
tion? Does the amount of feedback we get from this source outstrip the amount novices
get? I think the answer to both questions is yes. Please note that saying this doesn’t com-
mit us to the idea that we have a fully developed theory of where philosophical intuitions
come from. We clearly don’t have that (Weinberg makes this point clearly, pp.336-7).
But that isn’t what is at stake.
Philosophers, especially moral philosophers, have always been interested in theorising
about the nature of their methods with respect to intuitions. Sidgwick, Singer, Ross,
and Audi all spring to mind. Ryberg alludes to the various evolutionary accounts which
have been considered. However, this tendency is far from restricted to moral philosophy.
Philosophers tend to think about how intuitions are generated more than any novice and
are willing to reject, debunk, or regard with high suspicion, intuitions in certain domains
on the basis of their etiology. Explaining away intuitions is a big business and, although
the success conditions are not crystal clear, relies on an interest in etiology (see Ichikawa,
2009).12 There is good reason to think that philosophers get feedback about the quality
of intuitions from careful consideration of how intuitions are generated, certainly more
so than philosophical novices. Note that none of this is to deny that philosophers could
do with a great deal more theoretical illumination than they have, nor that it would be
a good idea to carry out the empirical research necessary to get that illumination.
I should clarify what I take myself to have argued up to this point. My main point is
that philosophers get considerably more intuition-independent feedback about the quality
of their intuitions than Ryberg countenances, and certainly more than novices. The next
question is this: Is this feedback is sufficient to found the assumption that philosophers
have more reliable intuitions than novices? Certain empirical findings in the literature
on expertise might lead one to think that it is not. Let me say something to dissuade
such thoughts.
It is true that the idea that intuition-independent feedback about the quality of intu-
itions is what is required to refine one’s intuitions is one which is well supported by the
empirical literature. Weinberg and Crowley (2009) note:
One of the most robust consensus findings of the study of expertise is that
10 This is no criticism of Weinberg. He is not engaged in quite the same debate.
11 This doesn’t require sources of direct corroboration; information about a lack of internal coherence
can be used to infer that the reliability of a source is below a certain level, e.g., intuitions that say
p 90% of the time and not-p the rest of the time are at best 90% reliable (about whether p).
12 Ryberg admits that one can reject intuitions for theoretical reasons (p.6), but argues this can’t
provide the right sort of feedback as any such reason must be based on intuitions somewhere down
the line. I have ruled out such a strong requirement of independence from intuitions. However,
Ryberg’s point here is odd for another reason: if Ryberg were right, there would be no obvious need
for an expertise defence. The challenge to intuitions relies upon that which Ryberg states can’t be
done. Intuitions which don’t exhibit gender effects are preferable to those which do. Why does the
restrictionist accept this? Because the moral properties of an action don’t vary depending on who
judges it. A theoretical reason which likely rests upon some basic logical intuitions or other.
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expert judgments can only become more reliable where experts are readily
confronted with clear, reliable feedback on which to train . . . The fields in
which competent experts routinely develop are those like meteorology, live-
stock judging, and chess. In such areas, experts are confronted with a truly
vast array of cases, with clear verdicts swiftly realized across a wide range of
degrees of complexity or difficulty. (Weinberg and Crowley, 2009, p.340)
The basic lesson might seem to be clear: unless philosophers get some comparable
feedback, we shouldn’t expect philosophers to have more trustworthy intuitions than
novices. It is certainly true that philosophers are not confronted with ‘a truly vast array
of cases with clear verdicts swiftly realized’. It is rare that philosophers have a source of
information to turn to which provides a clear, certain and unequivocal verdict: such-and-
such intuition was true/false. However, I argue that this doesn’t matter; such feedback
is not necessary in order for philosophers’ intuitions to be sufficiently refined, as rather
more modest forms of feedback (such as those discussed above) are quite sufficient.
One important reason to be cautious about adopting lessons from the empirical litera-
ture on expertise, concerns the nature of the debate. Remember that the question which
interests us is whether philosophers receive sufficient feedback to enable some significant
refinement of their intuitions. The relevant contrast is novices’ intuitions. This makes
philosophy a little different from the vast majority of the fields discussed in the empirical
literature, e.g., stock-picking and weather-forecasting. For, in many other fields, when
one is interested in the reliability of experts’ intuitions, the relevant contrast class is not
the intuitions of novices but rather other tools available to the experts, such as algo-
rithms (see Kahneman and Klein, 2009). This difference is important. Many lessons to
be found in the empirical literature, about the necessary amount of feedback needed for
experts’ intuitions to be plausibly relied upon, are not applicable in our debate, or at
least not straightforwardly. Our debate is not about whether philosophers’ intuitions are
to be expected to be as superior as those of experts in other fields. I don’t want or need
to defend the claim philosophers’ intuitions should be expected to be as superior to the
philosophical novice’s as the chess grandmasters’ are to chess novice’s—mutatis mutandis
for whichever field you like.13
In sum: I have discussed a number of sources of feedback which are available to
philosophers—feedback from available sources of external corroboration (construed to in-
clude indirect sources), detectability of margins, and theoretical illumination—and there
seems to be no good reason to think these sources of feedback are not sufficient to found
the expectation that philosophers’ intuitions are more reliable than novices’.
6 Conclusion
It is important to set aside various claims which I do not wish to endorse and for which
I have not argued. I am not claiming philosophers have perfect intuitions, nor that
philosophers should get away with this scot-free. Experimental philosophers are right:
we should be more careful about our use of intuitions, and make use of available empirical
tools to identify issues with intuitions. I certainly don’t claim that philosophers’ intuitions
13 Indeed I think it is unclear who would want to defend such a claim, and I am not alone: Williamson
(2011) expresses a similar sentiment, asking, “who ever claimed that the difference in skill at thought
experimentation between a professional philosopher and an undergraduate is as dramatic as the
difference in skill at chess between a grandmaster and a beginner?” (p.219).
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should be supposed to be as superior to the philosophical novice’s as the grandmaster’s
are to mine (a complete novice).
What I have done is to provide a limited defence of the expertise defence. I argued
for the following claim: the sort of objection to the expertise defence offered by Ryberg
(2013) doesn’t work. This is important because it threatened to undermine all defences
of intuitions in philosophy via appeal to expertise once and for all. I have argued that
philosophers’ experience does plausibly inform their intuitive capacities. Ryberg fails to
see this because he overlooks the simplest account of how philosophers’ experience might
do this: intuitions about cases are influenced by previous experiences of similar cases.
Moreover, I argued that this experience does plausibly refine philosophers’ intuitions.
Ryberg is wrong to conclude that we don’t get the right sort of feedback. We do receive
some sort of independent feedback about the quality of intuitions. Ryberg fails to see this
because he overlooks a number of sources of feedback we have about the quality of our
intuitions. Philosophers do receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions
from available sources of external corroboration (construed to include indirect sources),
detectability of margins and theoretical illumination. It is understandable that Ryberg
overlooked these sources. It is very tempting to take certain lessons from the empirical
literature on the development of expertise which would suggest that such sources are
not sufficient for the development of expertise. However, as I have argued, these lessons
are not applicable in this particular debate: a debate about whether we should expect
the intuitions of philosophers to be more reliable than those of novices. When assessing
the expertise defence, comparatively modest improvements upon novices’ intuitions are
significant in a way that they would not be if, for example, we were comparing philoso-
phers’ intuitions to some analogue of a sophisticated weather-predicting supercomputer.
We can expect such improvements given the feedback philosophers get (even if this is
not sufficient to support the idea that philosophers should be expected to outperform the
equivalent of sophisticated weather-predicting supercomputers, or be the philosophical
equivalent of a chess grandmaster).
We started with a question: Are the intuitions of philosophers more reliable than the
intuitions of people who are not philosophically trained? The question is important.
It is important because unless there is good reason to expect the answer to be ‘yes’ the
expertise defence of the use of intuitions in philosophy is a non-starter. I have argued that
we should expect philosophical experts to have more reliable intuitions about their field
of expertise than novices—just as we expect mathematicians and chess grandmasters
to have more reliable intuitions with respect to their domains of expertise. Ryberg’s
arguments threatened to shut down the expertise defence once and for all. I have shown
them to fail. Nonetheless, the reader shouldn’t walk away from this paper with the idea
that the expertise defence is home and dry. I have provided only a limited defence.
The take home message of this paper should be: if the expertise defence fails, it won’t
be for the reasons Ryberg gives. If the expertise defence doesn’t work, it is for other
reasons. For instance, it will perhaps be due to the fact that empirical evidence has been
found which indicates that philosophers’ intuitions are no more reliable than those of
philosophical novices (see, e.g., Machery, 2012; Schulz et al., 2011; Vaesen et al., 2013).
Or else, it will be due to the success of arguments that the expertise defence requires
more than the causality and quality assumptions to get off the ground: for example, that
of Weinberg et al. (2010) who makes the case persuasively that (a) the expertise defence
requires the assumption that philosophers’ training immunizes philosophers’ intuitions
from specific problematic types of sensitivity, e.g., gender effects, order effects, etc., and
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(b) philosophers’ training shouldn’t be expected to immunize their intuitions in this way.
So the overall prospects of the expertise defence may not be so rosy. But, in any case,
the debate over the comparative reliability of experts’ and novices’ intuitions can’t be
settled quite as easily as Ryberg hopes.
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